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  Ken-ichi Sasaki
Abstract
Under ongoing globalization the particularity of cultures has
become a major topic in contemporary aesthetics. Someone
insists on the right of national culture against globalism, others
wish to bridge cultures.[1] Apparently opposing one another,
they share the same gaze on the individual character of every
culture. To confirm or transcend our cultural or national
affiliation through art there exists the common dimension of
aesthetic persuasion: that is the subject of this paper.
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1. Persuasion as the Task of Propaganda
Many people claim, in the current trends of globalism, the
right of particular cultures. Such a claim must be driven by a
critical consciousness. Some go further to consider that,
because of their national character, genuine art works
contribute to solidify the tie binding the audience to their
culture. Here they believe in the persuasive power of art. Such
a belief goes against modern aesthetics, which not only expels
the persuasive function from the domain of the aesthetic but
also denies its possibility in the aesthetic field. I am going to
reflect on this problem, which I find interesting, in view of
renewing aesthetics.
I should be prudent and mention in advance that this paper
does not concern the aesthetic effect of the so-called "national
style" in art. For example, I perceive in a painting of Korin's
school (Korin Ogata, 1658-1716) or a porcelain of Kakiemon
something completely different, not only from those of the
West, but also delicately from those of China or Korea.
Because of this difference, I perceive them as Japanese. I do
not judge a Korin or a Kakiemon as Japanese on the basis of a
concept or a schema that may already have been established,
as a connoisseur might do. I just feel and perceive the
difference, and the concept ‘Japanese’ is something to be
constructed through an interpretation of these artworks among
others. As aesthetic experience, the national character of style
is not preserved. The sympathy I might conceive with the
Japanese style does not prevent me from enjoying Korean,
Chinese and Western paintings. Aesthetic judgment in
particular is characterized by this universality.
This being acknowledged, however, my intimate sympathy
with the Japanese is far from being an impure motive but
rather constitutes my aesthetic experience. Since such
sympathy stems from being in a cultural world, how can
aesthetic experience be lively without such feeling? The
aesthetic is rooted in ethics. In the case of literature and film,
on the contrary, the cognition of and sympathy to national
identity these arts might produce are not the effect of
aesthetic feeling but of a persuasion made by a diegetic

construction of the artwork: a novel, a drama, or a film can
suggest a notion of national identity, or inspire a satisfaction
or a pride in this identity, through its story. This is more or
less propaganda.
I mean by propaganda the activity aimed at inspiring or
confirming a real value consciousness by a discourse, including
fiction. I distinguish propaganda from brainwashing, which
consists in forcing a reformation of consciousness by violent
means, such as using a drug or repeating the same phrase
into the ear of someone who is physically bound. The task of
propaganda is to persuade because, in contrast to
brainwashing, it aims at the spontaneous agreement of the
audience. The difference is that propaganda concerns
thoughts, while ordinary persuasion seeks for agreement on a
certain action, such as a contract, vote, participation, or
marriage, etc.
To modern art consciousness, propaganda art seems very
suspicious because the aesthetic dimension as the element of
art is a world of appearance, denuded of reality. From the
standpoint of the concept of autonomous art, the intention to
serve a real purpose other than art itself is nothing but
corruption. In fact, however, the relation of the real world and
the artistic world of appearance is not something so incisively
differentiated. An artwork, seemingly very distant from the
real world, such as a blue monochrome painting by Yves Klein,
keeps a certain reference to the real world because we
experience it either as a blue we have never seen or as the
same blue we saw at such and such a time and place, for
example the marine blue of the Mediterranean that we
perceived in Nice. You might say that this is only a matter of
perceptual reference that should be set aside, and that it is by
contrast a serious matter for something to serve a real
purpose in propaganda. About this problem modern aesthetics
has not made a sufficient effort at theorization. Greek
tragedies and the epic of every race had definite political and
moral purposes, and it is beyond doubt that religious art,
which is the original form of art, is impure. The art forms
promoted by the Nazis and totalitarian socialist countries are
not the only forms of propaganda art: the works of a Homer,
an Aeschylus, a Fra Angelico, that is, most classical arts, are a
kind of propaganda art. Modern aesthetics, however, instead of
openly attacking this problem, has evaded it by pretending
that these arts are pure on the ground of their temporal
distance. If we wish to radically consider the possibilities of
art, propaganda offers an authentic topic.
Nevertheless, as soon as we approach this question modern
aesthetics starts its counterattack. These classical propaganda
arts are naive in the sense that they include their thesis or
lesson directly in their subject matter. But according to modern
aesthetics, this material particularity is easily overcome in
artistic experience, and indeed only those artworks that have
transcended their material particularity are considered to be
classical masterpieces. For example, I neither live in a society
in which the polis is based on blood relations nor follow the
morals of such a society. But in spite of this basic distance, the
political drama of The Persians excites me, and the religious
and ethical afflictions and conflicts of Orestes cause a deep
sympathy in me. The fact of not being Christian does not

prevent me from being moved by the profound piety of J. S
Bach's St. Mathew's Passion. These facts have been repeated
to satiety, so much so that they have become common-sense
matters. According to modern aesthetics, an aesthetic
experience is not only possible in spite of the material
particularities of the artwork but it also purifies and transforms
these particularities into something irrelevant. If so,
propaganda art is fundamentally impossible.
I do not pretend to resolve here directly this problem of
impossibility. My aim is rather modest: I wish to analyze the
tactics of propaganda in some concrete examples and to
evaluate the reach of its effect. To the fact that the material
particularity is in fact overcome and becomes irrelevant in
aesthetic experience I prefer to answer with another fact:
propaganda arts exist. My final goal is to prove that
propaganda is managed by a deep rhetoric. In the first half of
the paper, I will discuss the macro-structures, such as
viewpoint and the mode of being a person, which make
persuasion possible; in the second half, I will analyze some
examples of film for the purpose of exhibiting a concrete
mechanism of persuasion. I hope this reflection as a whole will
contribute to including the factor of propaganda in our sense of
the authentic art experience.
2. Viewpoint in Narrative Art
By viewpoint I mean narrative in its basic forms, namely the
narrative of human acts. Not only the epic, the drama, and the
novel, but also dramatic films and most classical ballets are
composed of narrative structures; even historical painting and
program music depict stories. I will refer to drama and film in
particular because I find in the narrative structure of these
arts the most efficacious means of propaganda. I think that
their efficacy comes primarily from the structural peculiarity of
these narrative arts, which imposes a definite viewpoint on the
audience.
J. Margolis speaks of the ambiguity of the paintings of A.
Kiefer in including Nazi's icons.[2] A picture can depict any
object and suggest to a certain extent its change and
movement, but the facts concerning modes of cognition, such
as negation, doubt, supposition, and time, etc., are properly
beyond its ability.[3] Consequently, a painting having a
swastika among its images certainly expresses something
about the Nazis, but we cannot tell solely from the image what
attitude the painter takes. All these facts that lie beyond the
reach of visual images belong to linguistic expression. Of
course, even propaganda art does not formulate the opinion to
be inspired directly with words. So the viewpoint in narrative
plays a useful role. A drama or film can charge the characters
with its basic opinion either in word or in action. It goes
without saying that there exist antagonists who embody the
opposite opinion and enter into conflict with the main
characters. Then it is the viewpoint the author gives to the
dramatic situation that indicates which is his opinion.[4] The
main character is the one who embodies this authorial
viewpoint and the representative in the drama with whom the
audience identifies itself in following the story.[5]
As to the viewpoint, it is important to touch upon a naive
illusion we easily entertain. As Aristotle says, unlike the epic

performed in narration, the drama presents all the characters
in actors' bodies: the former is a description according to a
certain vision, the latter a representation of reality in a strong
sense of the word. Their mutual relation is similar to that of a
portrait to a statue, an analogy which invites us to imagine
that while the epic has a fixed viewpoint, we can choose any
viewpoint for a drama just as we can in the case of a statue.
This is natural, however, and because natural, a deep and
imperceptible illusion. A dramatic world is not only a
perceptible three-dimensional space but also a spiritual world
constructed according to ideas. Analyzing the structure of
dramatic situations, Etienne Souriau thought that differences
between dramatic situations were produced by the
combination of several roles or "agents," such as "the thematic
force," "the representative of the value," "the opponent," etc.,
and in addition, the choice of the character from whose point
of view the situation is seen.[6] The viewpoint can be freely
chosen. But we should be careful; it is the author who chooses
the viewpoint, and the piece we read or see is constructed
according to a viewpoint already chosen by the author.
We might ask, then, if it is possible to produce a play from a
viewpoint different from that of the one given by the author. If
the viewpoint can be freely chosen, then this should be
possible, and that possibility should be very interesting
because it would suggest radical creativity on the part of the
producer (metteur-en-scène). But, unfortunately, this is
impossible in principle. The viewpoint is objectively structured
in the piece as well as the being and character of the dramatis
personae, their mutual relations, and the development of the
plot. For example, the dramatic world of Shakespeare's Hamlet
is constructed from the viewpoint of Prince Hamlet. Claudius,
who assassinated his real brother, the former king, and
Gertrude who, after the unexpected death of her husband,
agreed to marry her brother-in-law who succeeded her
husband to the throne must have their thoughts and wishes,
agonies and sadness. But we cannot know these as such
because, from the first line on, we see this dramatic world
through the jaundiced eyes of Hamlet. It is not because
Claudius and Gertrude are not given sufficient words. In a
sense, we know them well already, even better than Hamlet
does, so much so that we have no need to hear more
confidential talk from them. But we do not stop seeing the
dramatic world from the viewpoint of Hamlet. The truth of
Claudius and Gertrude is only episodic while the truth of the
tragic world of Hamlet is seen throughout from this prince of
Denmark.
Such is viewpoint. This fact is to be emphasized all the more if
it is usually thought that the viewpoint belongs to
interpretation to the extent that the creativity of the latter
depends on a free choice of viewpoint. The production (miseen-scène) is an interpretation but a special one. If we think of
mythical subjects such as Œdipus the King or Antigone, which
have been repeatedly dramatized by many poets, we see that
each poet presents a new interpretation of the myth in his or
her new version, and we may say that the novelty of such an
interpretation is measured by how different the viewpoint is
from one she or he could have taken. In short, the creativity
of interpretation here is supported by the bias and difference
of viewpoint. We cannot, however, generalize from this and

grant to the producer (metteur-en-scène) the same freedom
to choose a viewpoint different from the one given by the
author. The reason is but one: the author has to stage the
totality of the work and so cannot restructure the work to get
a different viewpoint. In a study or criticism you may talk
about Hamlet from the viewpoint of Claudius. Then, however,
you must be prepared for the objection that it is no longer the
Hamlet of Shakespeare. If you completely change the
viewpoint, you also revolutionize the work into another. We
have an excellent example of this in Rosenkranzt and
Guildenstern Are Dead (1966) by Tom Stoppard, which
remakes the story of Hamlet from the viewpoint of the two
minor roles.
The fact that the viewpoint is objectively structured in the
work can offer to a project of propaganda a very important
tactical foothold. We have only to embody the thought to be
inspired in the main character in whom the main viewpoint is
laid. But this might be too simple an observation. Every
dramatist know this instinctively, and even a scholar who
wishes to talk about the philosophy of a dramatist pays
attention at first to the words of the main characters. It is a
simple fact, the entrusting of the opinion to be inspired in the
audience to the main role is transparent persuasion, and
therefore not so efficacious. The secrets of persuasion must be
found beyond this.
3. Sympathy as Bridging Reality and Fiction
That transparent persuasion has no effect suggests an
intervention of the reality principle of the audience. This may
be his or her moral, religious, or political credo or the
requirements of his or her logical or aesthetic judgment. What
concerns us here is not the simple collaboration called the
"fusion of horizons;" there really is kind of conflict between the
creator and the appreciator. We have underlined the function
of the viewpoint in order to elucidate the structure of
persuasion in theater and film. The dramatic world of a play or
a film is constructed from a definite viewpoint, and we, the
audience, see this world in identifying ourselves with the main
character to whom the viewpoint is given. Now we must ask
about the limits of identification. How is this identification
possible? I should like to begin with this basic point.
We may profitably consult the philosophy of theater by the
French philosopher Henri Gouhier;[7] the "totality" mentioned
above is his idea. He defines theater as an art of presence. Of
course, he means by 'presence' the fact of the actor's
metamorphosis on stage before the audience. Indeed,
presence is peculiar to the theater.[8] According to Gouhier,
however, this presence is not simply given by actors but
absolutely requires the conspiracy of the audience. We, the
audience, know very well the person we see on stage is not
Hamlet himself but the actor George Pitoëff disguised as
Hamlet, and that Hamlet, the Prince of Denmark, should not
speak French with a Russian accent. Knowing all those things,
we nevertheless agree to regard him as Hamlet, as far as we
are the theater audience. This is too commonplace a fact to
notice; we can understand that this is a very basic condition
for the theater if we try to conceive a case where someone
dared to cancel this agreement.

This act of good will on the part of the audience in accepting
the fictional world is one of the most fundamental conditions of
theater. The identification of the audience with the viewpoint
structuring the piece is nothing but a concrete process of the
realization of this premise, that is, the agreement to the
fiction. The existence of a hero or heroine in drama is
inseparable from the existence of his or her surrounding world,
the truth of his or her world vision. Gouhier states this as
follows:
I am not required to believe what Sophocles
believed but to enter into the universe of his
belief so as to "make a tragedy of" what, in the
universe of another belief, might probably be
taken differently. If Antigone exists, she exists
with her belief in the invisible laws; without this
belief, she is not Antigone any more. You are free
to think that she is a little fool and that she
would do better to let the dead bury the dead.
On the pretext that her belief seems an illusion to
you, you find that her history has no sense: this
means that you refuse to believe in her existence,
and your bad will makes an outsider of you (vous
mettre hors du jeu).[9]
The theoretical discrimination is clear. What the audience is
requested to do is not to offer real consent but only to "believe
as if."[10] This corresponds in the field of perception to
"seeing as" (Wittgenstein): it is a problem of imagination. But
the imagination does not function except on the basis of the
facts or what we believe the facts to be. Isn't it the case that
the spiritual world of Antigone almost coincides with mine, so
much so that the discordant part (corresponding to "as if") is
in reality minimal? Otherwise her world would remain an
object of curiosity, which would hardly deeply interest and
even move me. Gouhier himself admits, at the end of the
quotation above, that failing to find this point of contact, we
have to leave the theater.
This is a fact that actors and producers know very well. Their
task is to struggle with the real interest and world vision of the
audience, soothing, humoring, and even browbeating to
persuade them. Gouhier presents a comment of the famous
French stage producer Gaston Baty on Racine's Bérénice. The
story of this tragedy is this: Titus has fallen in love with the
Jewish Queen Berenice on his journey and comes back to
Rome to find himself elected Roman Emperor; the Roman laws
prohibit the Emperor to marry a heretic woman, so he
renounces this love in spite of himself and sends Berenice back
to her country. According to Baty, while the audience at the
time of Louis XIV asked the Emperor to behave in the manner
peculiar to the sovereign, the contemporary audience are
mainly interested in the love being carried through.[11] That is
to say, to produce Bérénice now is to drag into an alien world
an audience that has a world vision quite different from that
supposed by the poet. If the other party has changed, then
you must naturally change the tactics. Here is the very core of
the task of propaganda, even in the broader sense of the
word.
This is surely a problem difficult to generalize about; the

difference of situation or personality very often decides the
case. To break through this difficulty, let us reflect on a
concrete example, the American filmSands of Iwo-Jima (1949,
directed by Allan Dwan).[12] Iwo jima is a volcanic island in
the South Pacific and was a hard-fought battleground in the
last phase of the Pacific War because the island was the best
situated for the U.S. army as a base camp for bombarding
Japan proper. The violence of the battle is testified to by the
fact that almost all of the 20,000 Japanese soldiers guarding
the island were killed. The film has as its main characters the
United States Marine Corps, which performed the operation. As
far as nationality is concerned, even if it was a past war, I
come from the "enemy" of the heroes in this film. Now videos
of this film are on sale and can be rented in Japan, which
signifies that many Japanese can enjoy this film that was
produced from the point of view of the old enemy. I myself
enjoyed it to a certain extent; my reserve stems not from the
real principle of being the enemy but from the quality of the
film.
The heroes of the film are Sergeant John Striker, played by
John Wayne, and his men. As part of the audience, I identify
myself with the sergeant in the scenes of trouble with the
troops, and with each of the marines in those of the larger
battle. This viewpoint remains the same even in the scenes of
direct struggle with Japanese soldiers. When a Japanese
soldier appears suddenly from behind and is ready to attack a
U.S. marine, I cry under my breath, in spite of myself, "Look
out!" That means I perceive the Japanese soldier as enemy at
that moment. At the next moment, when the Japanese soldier
is knocked down and riddled with bullets, I almost feel a
physical pain in my body. But it is not because the soldier is
my compatriot, but only a physiological reaction against the
violence of the scene. In short, following this film, I forget my
real principles and abandon myself to the logic of fiction. What
makes such an identification possible? Let us consult Gouhier
once more.
blockquote>On screen was being projected La Bataille du rail
(The Battle of the Railway), a good film about the French
Resistance. A German soldier is shot; two railway men hide
the corpse under a pile of coal: hilarity in the hall. As no
sympathy is present, hate has spontaneously removed from
their minds the fact that that man may be married, a family
man, a honest boy….[T]he hate has schematized him into a
type: the occupier. The dead man, then, is no more than a
bulky package, and his disposal becomes a good farce . . . .
――
Besides, we can conceive the same little scene happening in a
hall in Berlin, but at the moment when an enormous tank of
the German Army (Wehrmacht) crashes into the wicked armed
men of the Maquis.[13]
Gouhier gets to the heart of the problem of the sympathy the
audience feels for the hero to whom the main viewpoint is
given. His subject is the nature of the comical, and he
discusses here a certain abstraction as its condition: "This
abstraction rejects the historical reality of the person which
might cause sympathy, or pity or love."[14] We see now that
the keywords are 'person' and 'type.' A 'person' is our living

neighbor, with whom we can sympathize. Sympathy means
that we regard him or her as someone who has his or her own
joy, pain, anxiety, etc., just as we do. It is the experience of
human identification. A 'type,' on the contrary, is the result of
an abstraction that removes from the person his or her
historical reality or living aspect in common with us. As this
historical reality, which is to be removed here, is just the
object of our sympathy, from the beginning the type remains
out of the reach of sympathy, and this distance enables him to
become a target of laughter in a certain situation, just as the
"occupier" is made into a corpse.
According to Gouhier, what abstracted this soldier, reduced
him to a type, was the real hate the audience felt for the
German army. But I think that such a context is not all there
is to it. Not being able to see this film, I only imagine that the
film is constructed with this soldier as a type. The viewpoint
being from the anti-German Resistance, it is out of the
question to make the German soldier susceptible to the
audience's sympathy; he must absolutely be the occupier type.
Certainly the real hate against the enemy during war must
bring the reaction of laughter against the type to the extreme
of hilarity. Moreover, seen from the opposite side, a German
during the war could probably not enjoy or even watch La
Bataille du rail. But now, as the hate against enemy has gone,
a German might laugh at this sight. At least, as for the
Japanese soldier in Sands of Iwo Jima, I, a Japanese, have
seen him as simply the enemy, and it was impossible to see
him as an object of sympathy.
Now I think we have arrived at a provisional conclusion to the
foregoing discussion. This is that when the persuasion is based
on the sympathy the audience conceives for the hero, the hero
must be presented as a person with historical reality; and,
conversely, if the author wants to introduce an enemy, this
must be treated as a type. Whatever the real situation is at the
actual time of the creation or presentation of the
representation, this is an invariable principle for the
construction of a work. Then, since being a person is the mode
of existence common to every human being, shouldn't it be
that sympathy is realized at the level of universal humanity, so
that we cannot effectuate such a partial persuasion as
propaganda? As the audience's agreement with the credo of
the hero or heroine consists only in "believe as if," not in a
real conversion, the difficulty of persuasion is not resolved.
Now we must go beyond this mechanism of sympathy with the
hero or heroine and reflect on the persuasive effect of his or
her words and the construction of the work. Here, the principle
of reality in the audience functions once more as a basic fact
of the tactics of persuasion. The mechanism controlling
sympathy and antipathy by means of person and type is not
the last word and does not imply the purity of artworks.
4. The Mechanism of Persuasion
Is Sands of Iwo Jima a propaganda film? In other words, does
it contain any opinion it seeks to inspire in the audience? Let's
consider this point first. Being produced after the end of the
War of the Pacific, this film cannot be intended to whip up war
spirit. The most important motive and drawing point is,
without any doubt, an illustration of the famous news photo by

Joe Rosenthal of the scene of the U.S. soldiers hoisting the
Stars and Stripes on the hilltop of Suribachi-yama. Being
probably one of the most well-known photographs in history,
this shot must have impressed on Americans the idea of the
battle as one of the most glorious exploits of the U.S. Army.
The film makes special mention of this event (not the photo)
at the end of the title. In fact, we see towards the end of the
film this event as an inconspicuous episode in the battle; the
producer seems to say through this presentation that an event
that will become famous later happens in reality in a casual
way. Seen in relation to this photo, which must be the
creator's intention, the film appears as a kind of epic. Its
reception by the audience as anticipated by the producer must
be very different from that of a foreigner such as I, who looks
at the film a half century later.
For me, Sands of Iwo Jima is a home drama with the war or
army as its scenery. Sergeant John Striker, played by John
Wayne, trains his men very hard, and the officers put strong
faith in his troops. But he is unhappy in his family, divorced
from his wife, and suffering from being unable to establish a
trustful relationship with his son, aged ten, whom he loves
profoundly. He now has Pete Conway among his new men.
Having become a Marine by following his family's precepts,
Pete dislikes the Marine Corps, hates his father Sam, who has
recently been killed in action as a Captain, and rebels in every
instance against John, who respects Sam. The army is
anathema to an intellectual like Pete. Experiencing actual hard
fighting, however, and realizing that Striker has every reason
to be severe with his men, having his own life saved during
training by Striker, Pete opens his mind little by little, so much
so that he is now willing to give his father's name, Sam, to his
new-born son, and comes to feel a hearty friendship with
John.
The fierce battle having passed the critical point, they succeed
in hoisting the American flag on the hill top. Striker offers his
cigarettes to his fellow men to have a good smoke. Then a
Japanese sniper shoots him from behind; an instant death. He
leaves an unfinished letter to his son, which Pete takes to
finish, and the film ends. Thus this film has the following
dramatic structure. There are three father-son relationships:,
John and his son; Sam and Pete; and Pete and his new son.
These are symbolized by Sergeant John Striker and his man
Pete Conway and the friendship established between them
after a history of confrontation projected onto the three
paternal relations.
With this dramatic structure, this film is a home drama for me.
It was in reference to this structure that I perceived the
Japanese sniper in the film as an enemy. The scene of the
Stars and Stripes on the hilltop only suggested to me the
notion of the reality of the producer above-mentioned , and
helped me reflect on the iconicity of the photograph. In short,
even if there were some aspects of propaganda in it, they did
not enter into my horizon at all. But the American audience at
1949 must have seen the film quite differently. Having no
testimonies, I assume their reaction as follows: The American
audience was familiar with the scene of the Stars and Stripes
hoisted on the hilltop of Suribachi-yama.
(todaysseniorsnetwork.com ) It was a symbol of valor and

glory in winning a fierce battle; it was the very image of their
pride in being American citizens. One of the reasons they went
to the movie was to know the details of this glorious historical
event. In fact, the film was made in such a way as to respond
to this curiosity and, in addition, to confirm, almost physically,
their patriotism. I say "physically" because the film showed the
great glory as an extension of their daily life behavior. The
glory is not achieved by such exceptional heroes as Caesar or
Napoleon but by ordinary American citizens just like
themselves, in particular, by strong fathers. Strong fathers are
in general misunderstood, but they are justified by the results
of their deeds in this case, the conversion of the rebellious
Pete Conway. In short, this film proved to the audience the
justice of their patriotism based on daily life.
Seen immanently, as I saw it, Sands of Iwo Jima shows no
particular color of propaganda. However, in the context of the
real world, this film seems to have had a strong influence in
whipping up the patriotic spirit and strengthening the pride
and confidence of American people. It might not be intentional
propaganda, such as that made by a government, but rather
the result of the producer's will to respond to the virtual needs
of the American audience. The Second World War was over,
but in Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia there continued the
quickening of a new international order, seen in the collapse of
the old system, the coming to power of the Communists, and
the independence wars of old colonies. The opposition between
the United States and the Soviet Union had become obvious
and, in 1950, that is to say the year following the film's
production, the Korean War broke out. In short, it was a time
when America pursued a world-wide political strategy. It was
of greater importance to the national interest to confirm the
confidence of people in the existence and politics of America
than to lift up a fighting spirit against a definite enemy.[15] If
the film succeeded as propaganda, was not the strongest
reason for this that it did not directly advocate the idea it
wished to inspire in the audience?
We have an excellent textbook which teaches us the secret of
persuasion: Anthony's memorial speech addressed to the
murdered Caesar in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar (Act III,
Scene 2), which is one of the best examples of the rhetoric of
persuasion. First, Brutus ascends the platform and explains
why he could not but kill Caesar. "I loved Caesar, but I loved
Rome more. Because of my love for Rome, I dared to slay my
best friend. I have done no more to Caesar than you shall do
to Brutus." He is very serious from beginning to end, and his
speech is a masterpiece. He has fascinated the people, who
cry "Live!" Then comes Antony with the corpse of Caesar. After
calling him to the platform, Brutus leaves the forum. In this
atmosphere in which the entire audience is inclined to Brutus,
Antony begins his speech. Beginning "For Brutus' sake," he
declares that he wishes not to praise but to bury Caesar, and
continues: "The noble Brutus hath told you Caesar was
ambitious; if it were so, it was a grievous fault, and grievously
hath Caesar answer'd it." He does not contradict Brutus'
assertion that Caesar was ambitious. But neither does he
affirm it, and only suggests a slight doubt. Weaving into his
speech the famous dictum "Brutus is an honourable man," he
recalls one by one the famous deeds of Caesar. All these make
doubtful the claim that Caesar was ambitious. But Antony

never asserts as much. He has brought many captives to
Rome, whose ransoms filled the general coffers; when the
poor cried, Caesar wept. Aren't these a sign of something
different from ambition? But Brutus says Caesar was
ambitious, and "Brutus is an honourable man." I am not
disposed to stir you to mutiny and rage; I should do wrong to
the "honourable man." In this way, he repeats eight times this
famous phrase. The winning point is what he pretends to be
the "seal" of Caesar: leaving seventy-five drachmas to every
Roman citizen and making of his immovables a kind of public
garden. This he reads to the audience after keeping them in
long suspense. At the beginning, "honourable man" has
expressed what the audience believed, but the phrase comes
to sound more and more ironical, arriving finally at "what you
are made to believe to be true, but which is, in fact, a glaring
lie." The crowd, who saw off Brutus with cheers, having heard
Antony, now cry mutiny.
From this wonderful speech of Antony, we can extract the
secrets of persuasion. There are two points: to appeal only to
what the audience knows and believes, then to let the
audience formulate the conclusion for themselves. Antony
speaks only about what all the Roman citizens gathered there
know of Caesar. He completely avoids anything that sounds
like a false rumor, that is, what no one but himself knows. The
audience, hearing only what they know and believe, have no
occasion to doubt or oppose. Antony never contradicts what
they believe; he repeats "Brutus is an honourable man." By
repeating it, he leads every hearer to notice the contradiction
between what they believe and what they know, and leads
them to doubt their belief. Asserting that he has no intention
to stir people and pronouncing no word that calls on them to
do anything, he succeeds finally in making the Roman citizens
rise in riot.
Now we can verify that Sands of Iwo Jima as propaganda
conforms, in its mechanism of persuasion, to the secrets of
persuasion we find in Antony's speech. The political intention
mentioned above, that is, to confirm confidence that American
greatness and glory are achieved in an extension of their daily
life, including paternal relationships, was never pronounced in
the film. Probably, the audience does not notice it explicitly.
They only feel that their daily life at home has been
sublimated into American greatness.
5. Rocky IV and a Deeper Rhetoric
There remains just a final step in my reflection. Let us think
back to the arguments made so far. Propaganda, in the
broader sense of the word, being a kind of real persuasion, is
performed in the art of narrative construction such as drama
and film first of all through the function of the viewpoint of
dramaturgy. This viewpoint from which to survey the dramatic
world, usually given to the hero, is objectively structured in
the work by the author so that it is impossible to move it to
another character when the work is being performed.
Accordingly, the audience adopts this viewpoint on the
dramatic world; in other words, in most cases, we identify
ourselves with the hero in following the plot of a drama or a
film. Besides, since the audience needs a fixed viewpoint and
looks for one from the beginning, this identification with the

hero is something like a spontaneous agreement by the
audience. (Let us notice that this coincides with a secret of
persuasion taught by Julius Caesar.) Consequently, we may
find in the living philosophy and credo of the hero a means of
persuasion. But the audience does not unconditionally follow
the hero to whom the viewpoint is given. When his life style
and thoughts and credo are too unsympathetic, they leave the
hall or theater. So this principle of fiction, having a viewpoint
with which to identify, is always in competition with the reality
principle according to which the audience lives their real life.
We cannot hope that every speech pronounced by the hero
can persuade the audience.
Paying particular attention to the discourse of persuasion, we
find in the speech of Antony in Julius Caesar two secrets. In
the first place, it is to appeal only to what the audience knows
and believes, that is, to not impose on them anything contrary
to their knowledge and belief. In the second place, it is that in
cleverly leading the audience, the speaker should avoid
pronouncing the belief to be inspired but let them find it by
their own initiative. These two tactics also show the difficulty
of persuasion. It requires extraordinary skill to inspire an
antipathetic idea in an audience by speaking only of what they
know and believe. In fact, the amazing persuasion of Antony,
who succeeds in converting his audience completely, is
probably exceptional in the art of propaganda. Emphasizing
what the audience thinks does not equal persuasion. Because
of this, how can we perform persuasion by speaking only what
they think,? This is our last difficulty.
To present my solution in advance, this persuasion is a matter
of a deeper rhetoric, by which I mean that the persuasion is
performed at the subconscious level of the audience, or
beneath what they directly notice. The effect I assumed that
Sands of Iwo Jima had on Americans at the time of its
production has already shown this characteristic. To finish, let
us examine a more familiar example, in order to verify this
mechanism of persuasion. It goes without saying that special
attention is to be paid to the deeper rhetoric. We will take as
an example for examination Rocky IV (directed by Sylvester
Stallone, 1985).
Being the fourth of a popular series, this film takes for its
precedent the first three as prehistory and its own plot is
simple. Rocky is a well-known world champion of heavyweight boxing. Apollo Creed, from whom he once took the
champion belt, is now one of his best friends and serves him
as trainer. He feels, however, increasing desolation and is
thinking of returning to the ring. At this point Ivan Drago,
world champion of heavy-weight amateur boxing, and his
team come to the United States to promote his debut in
professional boxing. At a press conference they make a display
of the superhuman destructive power of the body trained with
all the latest technological means. Watching this television
broadcast, Apollo finds in it a good chance to make a
comeback and accepts an exhibition match with Drago. Having
held Drago in low esteem as an amateur having muscle power
but ignorant of boxing, Apollo is, however, killed by Drago's
death punches in the match, held in a hotel in Las Vegas with
a spectacular setting. Rocky then challenges Drago, and they
set this match to be held in Moscow on December 25. Amidst

the general hostility of the full public in the hall, the gong
sounds. Rocky gets well through the destructive punches of
Drago, and even knocks him down in the final round, by which
time the whole audience has begun to call Rocky's name. After
the fight, Rocky gives a short television interview in the ring
and says "We can change," which moves the public, including
the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, who
stands up to clap.
The story is a kind of revenge tale, and as perspicuous as all
kinds of didactic drama, including Westerns. Its clothing,
however, is political. The year 1985, when this film was
produced, can be regarded as the first year of the last phase
of the Cold War period. In March, Gorbachev was elected as
the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and in
the film the General Secretary attending the match is a copy
of Gorbachev. But this beginning-of-the-end is a course we
can only retrace in retrospect; at that time, we must have
considered ourselves to be in the midst of the Cold War. At the
opening of the film two boxing gloves appear. They turn, and
we discover on each of their backs a national flag: one of the
United States and one of the Soviet Union. They clash
together and go to pieces. This scene summarizes the meaning
of the plot and shows clearly the strong propaganda message
of the film. In a Western film, the death of the villains resolves
all. But that kind of resolution is impossible in the political
conflict between America and the Soviet Union. So Rocky IV
presents the subject of change. In the first place, when Rocky
was told by Apollo of his resolution to fight Drago, he tries to
dissuade him by saying, "We gotta change sometime." To
which Apollo retorts: "I don't want to change. Maybe you think
you're changing. But you can't change what you really are." In
the next place, explaining to his wife Adrian his resolution to
revenge Apollo, Rocky in his turn uses the same phrase: "I'm
a fighter. We can't change what we are." And the final use of
the phrase is made by Rocky in the ring just after the fight
with Drago, as his awakening: "…what I'm trying to say is . . .
that if I can change . . . you can change! Everybody can
change!" The very last message of the film is "I love you,"
addressed by Rocky through television to his son in
America.[16]
From the hate of the cold war to love, it is possible to change:
this is the message of the film. It is an explicitly pronounced
statement and not a deeper persuasion. Rocky IV appears to
be completely clear and explicit in its structure of persuasion.
But without the support of a true device of persuasion, which
is a deeper and silent rhetoric, this kind of explicit message
very often becomes transparent and weak. In fact, there
functions here a deeper rhetoric that gives true persuasive
power. Its mechanism is quite similar to that of Sands of Iwo
Jima in that, by using as support a thought so usual as to be
unnoticed, it emphasizes an ideological implication. Here,
however, the film achieves a higher perfection, since the
deeper rhetoric is embodied in the composition of the film
instead of relying on the real context. The basis of the
mechanism is the opposition of technology or artifice to
nature. Koloff, the fight manager accompanying Drago to the
United States, is proud of "the advances his country's made in
the technology of human performance," and asserts that "most
of the world is ignorant in body chemistry." Immediately a

reporter asks about "rumors of blood dropping and widespread
distribution of anabolic steroids in the Soviet Union." The
camera makes a close-up of the profiles of Koloff and
Ludmilla, the wife of Drago, to emphasize their "lie." Ludmilla
laughingly denies the rumors: "No, Ivan is naturally trained."
Then how has he gotten such extraordinary strength? She
answers with a joke: "Like your Popeye, he ate his spinach
every day."[17] Despite being proud of the fruits of
technology, Koloff and Ludmilla acknowledge that artifice is a
vice; that is to say, everybody thinks that nature is good,
artifice bad, without this being pronounced. If we refer to the
fact that America has been leading in technology and that its
position as a superpower relies largely on technology, this
thesis, assumed as evident, is paradoxical, and we have to
acknowledge in it a strong ideological implication.
The schema of nature-technology is emphasized in a long cutback scene of Rocky's and Drago's training. Rocky lives in a
rustic cottage under snow and goes jogging under the blue sky
on a white snowfield. Drago runs around in a dark and closed
gym with a low ceiling. As for the training of muscle, Rocky
lifts up stones, bears a log on his shoulders like Christ carrying
the cross, chops wood, and utilizes the barn's space, while
Drago makes use of different machines, the results of which
are counted by many electronic instruments and, as rumored,
gets an injection in his shoulder without showing any emotion.
The shot of Rocky felling a tall tree is doubled by another of
Drago knocking down his sparring partner. Rocky is
surrounded by the love of Adrian, who arrives later, of her
brother Paulie, and of Duke, the trainer. Drago is observed by
the selfish Koloff, by Ludmilla, who looks like a controller
rather than wife, and by technicians. Rocky continues his hard
training with clenched teeth; the wooden face of Drago is
distorted with pain throughout his training. More impressive
are the Russian peasants Rocky encounters while jogging.
They have no hostility toward him and are simply looking at
him curiously. This is the face of nature, which is contrasted
with that of Drago, Ludmilla, Koloff, and in particular those of
the audience around the ring in Moscow. Russians as such are
natural and good; the vice and artifice come from the
institutions of the Soviets. Through the fighting between one
body and another, Drago finally starts to show a strong defiant
attitude toward Kollof and cries: "I fight to win for me!"[18]
The public, abandoning the animosity they have shown at the
beginning, is starting little by little to praise Rocky's fighting.
In short, the mask of artifice is dropping and nature is
recovered.
You see now that this silent philosophy of nature and artifice is
the axiom supporting Rocky IV's message, "Let's change, we
can change." That is the evident truth, needless to pronounce,
that sustains the plot and in exchange is itself strengthened by
the emotion produced by the plot's development. An
impressive message is remembered. But a truly penetrating
influence on the minds of the audience comes from this deeper
layer. Certainly this axiom concerning naturalness is a
philosophy believed in by the American public, otherwise it
would be impossible to invoke it tacitly. In addition, since it is
not explicitly pronounced, it is not something against which
the audience can react. In the final phase, strengthened by
the emotion of the film, this conviction is fed back to the real

life of the whole audience. This is the structure of the deeper
rhetoric.
Now I think we are ready to answer our basic difficulty. We
have needed an answer to the objection that the would-be
conviction reproduced through the film simply repeats what is
evident to the audience, which of course is not a high
achievement and is far from real propaganda. This objection
appears entirely reasonable. But is it really? If the thought
that nature is good and artifice a vice is perfectly axiomatic, so
that all people from every culture share it, and if they regard
this as a most important proposition, then it is needless to
reproduce that belief. In the laboratory of Doctor Copperius,
however, the opposite was apparently the truth, and actually
our film depicts Russians as having faith in the modernism that
takes technology as good. A thought that appears evident in a
closed cultural zone such as America shows its ideological
meaning when we consider it in a wider horizon. The deeper
rhetoric has a significance as persuasion, in reproducing this
American world view or bias of their nationality.
What is the effect of Rocky IV on audiences other than
American? While Sands of Iwo Jima was, for me, a simple
home drama with war scenery, Rocky IV, which contains a
mechanism of persuasion in its construction, might have a
rather international reach as propaganda. For a Japanese
audience, being allied politically to America, sharing the same
image of the Soviet institution, and believing even more firmly
than America in the power of nature, the message "Let's
change, we can change" might have been easily accepted in
1985. But it would have been accepted not as directly
concerning the Japanese but in the first place as an American
affair. This must have attenuated the realistic effect of the
work and changed it a little into something like a fairy-tale.
Then, if the film had been shown in Moscow in 1985, how
would Russians have received it? The following is purely my
assumption: For those who were loyal to the policy of the
government, Rocky IV must have been a lie unworthy of
looking at and false propaganda by the cat's-paw of
capitalism. It would not be surprising if they even refused to
look at the film. The persuasion would not be successful, in
this case, because the depicted facts were entirely different
from what they knew. If there had been some people who
could enjoy the film, they must have been those who
sympathized with the axiomatic premise of the film concerning
nature and artifice. To those who in addition opposed the
Communist regime, Rocky IV must have appeared even more
strongly colored with ideological import.
The ground for persuasion is entirely the philosophy of nature
and technology. The relation of this philosophy to the message
"Let's change, we can change" is quite indirect, and this
distance represents the depth of the rhetoric. This message,
however, is not the only one that is related to the philosophy
of naturalness. Every motif related to this axiom has a
persuasive effect and constitutes "the American" expressed by
the whole work so as to make it appear more real. As an
example of such a motif, we can quote the words of Drago
once he has returned to nature: "I fight to win for me." This
cliché of individualism, which in fact is almost egoistic, is
probably an American motto. Drago, who has been wooden,

throws these words first with anger upon Koloff, who has been
controlling him. This anger signifies that he has now returned
to wild nature, being finally freed from the spell of the regime;
his expression "for me" is a cry of nature as well, and the
implied individualism is presented as a natural, true, and good
concept.
More importantly, this marks at the same time the defeat of
"the Sovietic" in Drago. "Let's change, we can change" can be
convincing because it is the awakening Rocky has arrived at
through fighting and winning; the conquest of the Cold War
must come about through the triumph of nature, that is of
America. The physical victory of Rocky in the ring is the victory
of American individualism. That this victory is a matter of
justice is never even slightly doubted. The message "Let's
change, we can change" is tightly united with this concept of
"the American," which is visualized in Rocky's trunks decorated
with the Stars and Stripes. The catharsis Rocky IV causes in
an American audience is an effect of a deeper rhetoric that
inspires a conviction on the reality of and a pride in American
justice. The effect of the deeper rhetoric works silently in such
a way as to control people's behavior from then on without
being noticed as such. That is a power penetrating into the real
world.
Probably I should answer theoretically the problem of the
impossibility of propaganda in aesthetic experience. The effect
of a deeper rhetoric reaches to reality. That, however, does
not prevent the experience from being aesthetic. An
experience is aesthetic because we distance ourselves from
the material content of the work, so much so that we refrain
from taking it as real. Seeing Rocky IV in 2008, I, as a
Japanese person, ensure the same aesthetic position as a
modern audience watching The Persians. The deeper rhetoric
does not conflict with the aesthetic attitude but rather works
better with it because the distance peculiar to the aesthetic
makes the depth possible. The fact of its persuasiveness
shows purely and simply that the aesthetic experience is
rooted in and open to reality. The deeper and silent rhetoric
undoes the modern myth of the superficiality of the aesthetic.
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